The UK Labour government’s 2024 Labour party manifesto notably contains no mandate regarding a policy on digital ID, leaving this critical issue unaddressed in their official commitments. This absence is significant because the manifesto serves as the public contract that parties present to voters, outlining clear intentions and priorities. Without a specific manifesto commitment on digital ID, it is difficult to argue that the government has a clear democratic mandate to proceed with policies mandating its use. The Labour party’s 2024 manifesto can be reviewed in detail, and the omission of a digital ID policy is conspicuous.
No manifesto – no mandate?
The doctrine that ‘no manifesto commitment equals no mandate’ is fundamental to democratic accountability. Manifestos are essential for transparency and voter consent. If a government moves forward on a contentious policy without prior voter endorsement documented at election time, it risks undermining trust and legitimacy. Voters have no clear mandate to consent to policies they were not informed of or did not expressly support. This principle holds particularly true for sweeping digital identity schemes whose social, ethical, and privacy implications are profound.
Interestingly, although the manifesto mentions the Online Safety Act, which has drawn significant commentary and criticism (including my earlier analysis), it remains silent on digital ID, despite the latter’s equally controversial and far-reaching consequences.
Recent events highlight the risks surrounding digital identity systems and data security. Discord, a widely used communication platform, recently suffered a data breach exposing customer service data. Such breaches reinforce fears about the vulnerability of personal data, which would be even more concerning if linked with mandatory digital ID schemes.
Three million signatures to oppose digital ID
Despite almost 3m signatures opposing digital ID on a government petition, the government’s response has been to confirm that: “It will not be compulsory to obtain a digital ID but it will be mandatory for some applications.” They further clarify: “it will not be a criminal offence to not hold a digital ID and police will not be able to demand to see a digital ID as part of a ‘stop and search’.” This argument reveals an ambiguous approach and does not fully alleviate citizens’ concerns, especially as it creates mandatory requirements in certain contexts.
The government explains its rationale by stating that digital ID will be a legal requirement in some cases, such as employers verifying the right to work to combat illegal immigration, since “only UK citizens and legal residents will be able to have one”, and alternative routes will be offered for those unable to use smartphones. However, my earlier work on related immigration issues has warned that shifting blame onto immigration risks a slide towards authoritarian tendencies.
Opposition from human rights organisations
Opposition to digital ID spans multiple respected UK NGOs (non-governmental organisations). Liberty Human Rights warns that compulsory digital ID will exclude some of the most marginalised members of society. Amnesty International has expressed serious concern that such schemes could put vital personal information at risk. Big Brother Watch calls for the abandonment of Starmer’s mandatory digital ID plans, citing civil liberties risks.
This opposition extends across the political spectrum, and parties with a variety of ideologies are against digital ID.
EU citizens living in the UK already have digital-only ID, and the charity The3Million, who help EU citizens who have problems with their online-only digital status (Settled Status), knows all too well things can and will go wrong. There have been regular reports of the Home Office computer being offline, records going missing or being mixed up, and a blip that changes people’s nationality (such as earlier this year, when suddenly a large number of EU Settled Status holders were marked as Chinese on the Home Office computer).
On the other hand, some organisations, such as the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, support digital ID, viewing it as a “defining step for Britain” to modernise governance.
Smartphone security and privacy issues
An additional practical concern is the high rate of smartphone theft in the UK, which places banking and identity information at risk, potentially making digital ID a tool for fraud. According to insurance data, the UK accounts for two-fifths of all mobile phone thefts in Europe, with claims rising 425% since 2021, and 42% occurring in London. Incidents of phone theft in nightclubs, such as those reported in Bristol, where dozens of devices were stolen, worsen these risks.
Furthermore, digital ID could threaten the privacy and safety of transgender and non-binary individuals. Campaigners warn that such systems could inadvertently ‘out’ people by linking gender identity information to digital profiles.
The potential impact on the Good Friday Agreement is also a critical concern. Michelle O’Neill, Northern Ireland’s First Minister, has described the UK-wide compulsory digital ID scheme as “ludicrous, ill-thought out” and an “attack” on the Agreement, which allows people in Northern Ireland to identify as British, Irish, or both. The UK government insists any changes will respect the agreement, but the tension remains.
Other countries also have digital or physical ID requirements
Digital ID is not a novel concept globally; several countries already have digital ID schemes that the UK government plans to learn from. Estonia, Denmark, and India are cited as examples of countries with successful systems. Across the EU, nearly all member states use physical ID cards in a standard machine-readable format for travel and verification, with Denmark and Ireland adopting digital solutions. The EU’s upcoming eIDAS 2.0 regulation will require member states to provide digital identity wallets by 2026.
Ireland’s government is introducing a digital wallet encompassing driving licences and health records, aiming for interoperability within Europe. However, as of now, this system is not mandatory and is only piloted among public servants.
Serious concerns about data security surrounding digital ID systems are exemplified by Ukraine’s recent data scare involving its ‘Diia’ app. Despite reports of a data leak, Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation has denied these claims, stating the circulated files are fake. This incident underscores the sensitivity and scrutiny digital ID infrastructure attracts.
The UK government should reconsider
In conclusion, given the lack of a clear mandate in the Labour party’s 2024 manifesto and widespread opposition from NGOs, political factions, and affected communities, alongside significant privacy and security risks, the UK government should reconsider and ultimately even drop the proposal to make digital ID mandatory. A policy with such profound consequences should be decided transparently and with explicit democratic endorsement, respecting the rights of all residents, regardless of citizenship status or legal standing. Digital ID should remain voluntary and carefully regulated, rather than imposed as compulsory, to safeguard civil liberties and social inclusion across the UK.
Once the consultation process is underway, it is essential for individuals to actively participate and voice their concerns and issues regarding digital ID. Public engagement through consultation is a vital step in ensuring that policymakers are fully aware of the potential risks and social implications. People should take this opportunity to raise questions about privacy, security, and the impact on vulnerable groups, including transgender and non-binary communities. Additionally, it is crucial to communicate these concerns to local members of parliament, urging them to defend citizens’ rights and oppose any push towards mandatory digital ID without proper safeguards and democratic consensus. Active participation can help shape a more transparent and accountable approach to digital identity policies.
