The Online Safety Act 2023 was introduced to protect children from harmful online content, but its implementation has exposed difficulties with enforcement, cross-border jurisdiction and freedom of expression. Rather than continually expanding Ofcom’s powers, the UK should pursue closer alignment with the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and explore renewed participation in the Single Market, including its Digital Single Market framework.
Evidence that the Online Safety Act is failing
Ofcom’s Report on content harmful to children, prepared under section 63 of the Online Safety Act, recommends adding body stigma and depression content to the priority categories of harmful content. However, it found no significant change in the proportion of children encountering harmful content during the first nine months after the children’s safety duties came into force in July 2025. Ofcom also acknowledges limitations in its research, including search data that cannot distinguish children from adults and risk assessments that do not fully account for circumvention through VPNs (Virtual Private Networks).
During the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee’s oral evidence session on 20 October 2026, Ofcom chief executive Dame Melanie Dawes acknowledged that the act does not give Ofcom the power to require an American website to block access in the United States simply because UK users circumvent geographical restrictions through VPNs. Ofcom also faces difficulties collecting fines from overseas companies without UK assets.
In a letter dated 6 October 2026, Ofcom proposed strengthening business disruption measures by enabling pre-emptive orders, allowing disruption measures for failure to pay fines and lowering the threshold for urgent interim orders. These proposals illustrate the limitations of the existing framework and raise questions about how far enforcement powers should be extended.
The Imgur case and Brexit’s regulatory consequences
Imgur illustrates the complications of regulating overseas platforms. In February 2026, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) fined its US owner, MediaLab AI, £247,590 for failing to check users’ ages, unlawfully processing children’s personal data and failing to conduct a data protection impact assessment. The fine was imposed under the Data Protection Act 2018 and UK GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), not the Online Safety Act. Imgur had blocked UK users in September 2025.
Imgur’s geographical restrictions also create problems for people who are not necessarily visiting Imgur directly. For example, a UK user reading an entirely separate website might encounter the message “Content not viewable in your region” because that website embeds images hosted on Imgur to save storage space and bandwidth. The user may simply be trying to read an article, browse a discussion or view an otherwise legitimate webpage. If its images are hosted on Imgur, blocking UK access to the image-hosting service can prevent those images from appearing on unrelated websites, inconveniencing both readers and publishers. It could also encourage users to turn to VPNs to circumvent the restrictions, adding complexity for ordinary users while potentially undermining the effectiveness of the geographical block. This illustrates how geoblocking can have unintended consequences across the wider internet without necessarily making children safer.
MediaLab’s estimated annual global turnover of $50mn to $100mn, according to LeadIQ, suggests the penalty may be relatively modest for the company, although this estimate is not an audited financial figure. The wider problem is that a company can restrict access from Britain while continuing to operate internationally, leaving UK users excluded without necessarily improving safety elsewhere.
Previous reporting has also documented American news websites blocking European visitors over GDPR compliance concerns.
Brexit has changed the UK’s position within the European regulatory framework. The Geo-Blocking Regulation (Revocation) (EU Exit) 2019 revoked the retained application of Regulation (EU) 2018/302 and the associated domestic enforcement framework. However, the original EU regulation did not prohibit all geoblocking. It targeted specified forms of unjustified discrimination based on nationality, residence or establishment within the Single Market, subject to defined exceptions.
Article 4 covers certain electronically supplied services, but the regulation contains exclusions and does not impose a universal ban on geographical restrictions affecting every image-hosting, cloud-storage or web-hosting service. Nor does it prohibit every restriction required by law. Its scope must therefore not be overstated as a blanket ban on geoblocking.
The UK’s departure from the Single Market removed it from this shared framework. Renewed participation could improve cooperation and reduce fragmentation, although it would not automatically restore every former arrangement or resolve all enforcement difficulties involving overseas companies.
The problem with defining a UK user
Geoblocking also raises practical questions about what constitutes a “UK user”. An overseas visitor temporarily staying in Britain might lose access to services available in their home country. A British citizen travelling abroad might encounter restrictions on UK services, while a UK resident using a foreign VPN server could appear to be accessing the internet from another country.
Northern Ireland presents additional complications. An Irish citizen crossing the border may connect to Northern Irish Wi-Fi and receive a UK-based IP address. However, an Irish mobile customer roaming on a UK network can often retain an Irish IP address because their internet traffic is routed through their home operator. This depends on the operator’s technical arrangements, so roaming does not guarantee either an Irish or a UK IP address.
Consequently, an Irish person physically present in Northern Ireland could potentially continue accessing services available in Ireland if their connection is identified as Irish. Conversely, a UK resident using a VPN server in Ireland could appear to be accessing the internet from Ireland despite being physically in Britain.
These distinctions matter because IP addresses cannot reliably establish nationality, residence or legal status. Poorly designed restrictions could inconvenience cross-border communities, although geoblocking would not automatically constitute a breach of the Good Friday Agreement.
VPN restrictions, smartphone scanning and human rights
At the October hearing, Ofcom acknowledged that VPNs can undermine geoblocking and that restricting their use would be a possible, but politically contentious, response. Reclaim The Net reported that Ofcom also wants stronger disruption powers, including urgent blocking measures while investigations continue.
VPNs are legitimate tools for privacy, cybersecurity and secure remote working. Restrictions would therefore affect ordinary users as well as people circumventing age checks. The debate also raises broader questions about whether measures intended to protect children could lead to disproportionate surveillance of the general population.
In my North West Bylines article, State surveillance by the back door: nudity ban and app restrictions, I examine the human rights implications of smartphone nudity-detection measures and restrictions on digital services. The article discusses the potential consequences of device scanning for privacy, encryption, cybersecurity and freedom of expression, drawing on relevant European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgments.
The European Court of Human Rights, which is separate from the European Union and remains relevant to the UK, has emphasised the dangers of disproportionate internet blocking. In Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey and Vladimir Kharitonov v. Russia, the Court examined restrictions that affected websites beyond their intended targets or lacked adequate safeguards.
Other judgments, including Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom and Roman Zakharov v. Russia, address safeguards against unjustified surveillance and interference with privacy. These cases do not establish that every form of geoblocking, age verification or device scanning is automatically unlawful. They underline the importance of clear legal authority, necessity, proportionality and independent oversight.
The Court of Justice of the European Union also demonstrated a nuanced approach in case C-788/24 concerning the online publication of Anne Frank’s manuscripts. Its July 2026 ruling recognised that a geoblocking measure can remain effective for copyright purposes even when some users circumvent it through VPNs. The case illustrates that a measure need not be impossible to circumvent to be legally effective.
The central question is whether child-protection measures can achieve their objectives without creating disproportionate risks for the privacy, security and freedom of expression of the wider population. Safer platform design and targeted interventions should be prioritised over blanket restrictions or intrusive monitoring of personal devices.
Why the EU’s Digital Services Act offers an alternative
The Digital Services Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065) provides a common framework for platform accountability. Article 28 requires platforms accessible to minors to implement appropriate measures to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security. The DSA also prohibits targeted advertising to minors based on profiling and requires very large online platforms and search engines to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including risks affecting children.
The European Commission proposed the EU KIDS Act in September 2026 to build on the existing framework. The proposal would introduce common EU rules on children’s access to certain online services, alongside stronger safety-by-design requirements. It would prevent children under 13 from having social media accounts, allow parents or guardians to establish restricted, supervised accounts for children aged 13 and 14, and permit independent accounts from the age of 15. These age rules would apply to specified social networking and video-sharing services that meet defined risk criteria, rather than automatically covering every social media platform. The proposal also includes measures addressing addictive design features, unwanted contact from strangers, privacy settings and AI companions. However, the KIDS Act remains a legislative proposal and must be considered by the European Parliament and Council before it can become law.
The EU’s framework is not without enforcement challenges, and it should not simply be described as a softer regulatory regime. The proposed KIDS Act would itself introduce significant restrictions on children’s access to certain services, alongside more stringent requirements for age assurance and platform design. The key distinction is not that the EU necessarily imposes fewer restrictions, but that it seeks to establish common rules across the Single Market, supported by coordinated enforcement and safeguards for fundamental rights. The proposal therefore offers a potential model for regulatory cooperation, although its effects on privacy, freedom of expression and children’s autonomy will depend on the final legislation and how it is implemented.
Conclusion
The UK should pursue closer alignment with the EU’s Digital Services Act and explore rejoining the Single Market, including its Digital Single Market framework, where politically and legally achievable. Brexit has left Britain outside a shared regulatory framework, increasing regulatory divergence and making cooperation with European partners more complicated. Closer alignment could help reduce fragmentation and improve coordination, although it would not remove the practical difficulties of enforcing rules against companies based outside the UK and EU.
I do not want the UK to move towards the levels of internet censorship and state control associated with Russia and China. Although Britain remains a democracy with independent courts and human rights protections, expanding website-blocking powers, restricting VPNs or introducing indiscriminate surveillance could undermine the freedoms that distinguish democratic societies from authoritarian states. The UK must not sacrifice freedom of expression, privacy and access to information in pursuit of online safety.
Closer cooperation with the EU offers a better alternative to attempting to regulate the global internet independently. The Digital Services Act provides a common framework for platform accountability, systemic risk assessments and child protection, while European human rights standards emphasise the importance of necessity, proportionality and independent oversight. The EU’s approach is not without flaws, but coordinated regulation offers Britain greater influence over international technology companies without relying primarily on increasingly restrictive domestic powers.
Child protection should focus on safer platform design, effective age-appropriate safeguards, transparent risk assessments, digital literacy and proportionate enforcement. Encryption, VPNs, privacy and lawful access to information must also be protected. Any restrictions should be evidence-based, narrowly targeted and subject to independent scrutiny.
Ultimately, making websites inaccessible is not the same as making the internet safer. Rather than pursuing an increasingly isolated regulatory approach that risks expanding censorship while struggling to enforce its own rules, the UK should work more closely with European partners. A safer internet must protect children without compromising the fundamental freedoms of everyone else. Britain should remain firmly on the side of an open, democratic and rights-respecting internet, not move towards the censorship practices of authoritarian states.
The author used AI help to create this article to overcome dyslexia.
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